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1

Introduction

Business taxation and financial stability are intrinsically related.1 This is
mainly due to the fact that, despite recent financial crises, almost all tax
systems encourage the use of debt over equity finance. Though this ”debt
bias” has been reduced by tax devices such as thin cap and earning stripping
rules, it still persists (see, e.g., De Mooij and Hebous, 2018, and the articles
quoted therein, as well as Sinn, 2010).
In this article, we use a simple stochastic model to analyze the effects
of default on a representative firm’s value, as well as on tax revenue and
welfare (that is equal to the summation between the firm’s value and the
expected tax revenue).2 Given this simple framework we show that welfare
and tax revenue crucially depend not only on the relevant statutory tax
rate but also on default risk and its expected cost.3 It is worth noting that
the cost of default is affected by both market conditions and default rules.
Since a change in these rules is feasible, we can say that, to some extent,
a policy-maker can affect default costs.4 Similarly, volatility is affected by
both systemic and firm-specific risk. If therefore a policy-maker can affect
systemic risk, it is useful to study the effects of volatility on a firm’s value as
well as on welfare.5
1

For instance, Kocherlakota (2010) argues that bailouts are inevitable if the default
of firms causes systemic failure. For this reason, he proposes a Pigouvian tax, aimed at
offsetting negative externalities arising from financial instability.
2
For simplicity, we assume symmetric information and full interest deductibility. For
a detailed analysis on business taxation under asymmetric information, see Cohen et al.
(2016) and the articles cited therein. Partial interest deductibility is left for future research.
3
In this article we focus on the tax rate effects. For a complementary analysis on the
effects of corporate tax base changes, see Panteghini and Vergalli (2016).
4
Adalet McGowan and Dan (2018) provide a comprehensive analysis of insolvency procedures across OECD countries and find that they are quite heterogeneous. In particular,
they state that ”[a] comparison of the 2010 and 2016 values suggests that recent reform
efforts have been largest for prevention and streamlining, with reforms observable in 11
countries, especially European countries (e.g. Portugal). This may reflect the fact that
such measures have been recently endorsed by the European Commission and the IMF,
in response to the crisis [...]. Barriers to restructuring have also declined in 10 countries,
while reform activity affecting the personal costs to failed entrepreneurs has been less ambitious, with only Chile, Greece and Spain undertaking reforms since 2010”. Of course,
heterogeneous rules can lead to heterogeneous default costs.
5
Here, we deal with one policy-maker who can implement both monetary and fiscal
policies, although we are aware that separate entities deal with them. As pointed out by
Sinn (2018) however, the separation of roles sometimes vanishes and a central bank can
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As will be shown, welfare and tax revenue crucially depend on tax rates as
well as on volatility and the expected cost of default.6 In particular, welfare is
decreasing in the tax rate under default risk. Tax revenue is always increasing
in the statutory tax rate and hence no Laffer curve is found. Moreover,
an increase in the expected cost of default raises tax revenue and decreases
welfare. Similarly, volatility raises (reduces) the expected value of tax revenue
(welfare). Thus, a more stable financial system is beneficial from a social
point of view, although it leads to lower tax revenue and vice versa. A similar
effect is found for the default cost which increases (reduces) tax revenue
(welfare). This means that the government faces a policy dilemma. For
any given tax rate indeed, the government should reduce (increase) financial
instability and default costs if its objective function is welfare (tax revenue).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple
trade-off model and calculates the value function of a representative firm, as
well as tax revenue and the value of welfare. Section 3 provides a numerical
analysis where the effects of changes in the tax rate, default risk and its
expected cost are examined. Section 4 summarizes our findings, discusses
their policy implications and discusses possible extensions of our analysis.

2

The model

In this section we apply a continuous-time model in line with Goldstein et
al. (2001). By assumption a representative firm can borrow from a perfectly
competitive credit sector, characterized by a risk-free interest rate r. Moreover, we let the firm’s Earning Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), defined as
Π, be stochastic and follow a geometric Brownian motion:
dΠ
= σdz, with Π0 > 0,
Π

(1)

dramatically affect fiscal policy. The reverse may also be true when bank taxes are levied
(Keen and de Mooij, 2016).
6
Welfare analysis of business taxation has already been studied by other authors. See,
e.g., Sørensen (2017) who shows that the socially optimal debt-asset ratio is 2-3% below
the current debt level. As a consequence, a reduction in leverage due to limitations on
interest deductibility would lead to a welfare gain of about 5% of corporate tax revenue.
See also Gordon (2010) and Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) who calculate the efficiency
cost of a tax distortion in the debt-equity decision. However, these articles are based on a
deterministic framework and therefore disregard the effects of default risk (and financial
(in)stability).

3
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where Π0 is the initial EBIT, σ is the instantaneous standard deviation of
dΠ
, and dz is the increment of a Wiener process.7 Moreover, we introduce
Π
the following:
Assumption 1 At time 0, the firm borrows some resources and pays a
coupon C, which cannot be renegotiated.
Assumption 2 If the firm does not meet its debt obligations, default occurs
and hence, the firm is expropriated by the lender.
Assumption 3 The cost of default is equal to a percentage α ∈ [0, 1) of the
defaulted firm’s value.
Assumption 1 means that the firm sets a coupon and then computes the
debt market value. Without arbitrage, this is equivalent to first setting the
debt value and then calculating the effective interest rate. For simplicity, we
also assume that debt cannot be renegotiated: this means that we apply a
static trade-off approach where the firm’s financial policy cannot be reviewed
later.8
Assumptions 2 and 3 introduce default risk and its cost, respectively.
Given (1), if the firm’s EBIT falls to a given threshold value, denoted Π, the
firm is expropriated by the lender (assumption 2), who becomes equityholder.
Default causes a sunk cost borne by the lender. By assumption, this cost is
proportional to the value of the firm (assumption 3).
Following Goldstein et al. (2001) we also introduce the following:
Assumption 4 The threshold level Π is chosen by equityholders at time 0.
Assumption 4 implies that equityholders behave as if they owned a put
option, whose exercise leads to default.9
Given these assumptions, the firm’s net profit function is equal to ΠN =
(1 − τ ) (Π − C) , where τ is the relevant tax rate.
7

The general form of the geometric Brownian motion is dΠ = µΠdt + σΠdz where µ is
the expected rate of growth. With no loss of generality, here we set µ = 0.
8
The analysis of a dynamic trade-off model, where firms can subsequently adjust their
capital structure is left for future research.
9
For further details on the characteristics of default conditions see, e.g., Leland (1994)
and Panteghini (2007a).

4
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It is worth noting that a tax saving due to debt-finance arises as long as
the business tax rate is higher than the lender’s rate (see, e.g., Panteghini,
2007b). For simplicity, here we assume that the lender’s pre-default tax rate
is nil. When, however, default takes place, the lender becomes equityholder
and is therefore subject to corporate taxation.
Finally, the firm’s value function is equal to the summation between debt,
D (Π) , and equity, E (Π):
V (Π) = D (Π) + E (Π) .

(2)

By maximizing V (Π) , the optimal coupon C will be found.

2.1

The value of debt and equity

Let us start with debt. According to assumption 3, the (sunk) default cost
is a percentage α of the defaulted firm. Hence, the lender will own (1 − α)
of the defaulted firm.10 Using dynamic programming, we can therefore write
debt as follows:

(1 − α) (1 − τ ) Πdt + e−rdt ξ [D(Π + dΠ)] after default,
D (Π) =
(3)
Cdt + e−rdt ξ [D(Π + dΠ)]
before default.
As shown in Appendix (A.1), (3) can be rewritten as:
( (1−α)(1−τ )Π
after default,
i 
hr
D (Π) =
β
2
(1−α)(1−τ
)Π−C
C
Π
+
before default,
r
r
Π

(4)

q 
1 2
where β2 = 12 −
+ σ2r2 < 0. As shown in (4), before default the debt
2
value consists of two terms. The first one, Cr , is a perpetual rent which
measures the debt value without default, while the second term accounts for

Π β2
the default effects. In particular, term Π
measures the present value of
1 Euro contingent on the default event. After default, the lender becomes
)Π
equityholder and the value of his/her claim is equal to (1−α)(1−τ
.
r
10

As pointed out by Estrin et al. (2017), economic agents are sensitive to different
elements of the default codes. Moreover, the authors show that some countries are more
debt-friendly than others. All of these features are here summarized by our parameter
cost α. If therefore countries are debtor-friendly (-unfriendly), α is expected to be lower
(higher). For a detailed (and economic) analysis of default procedures see also Claesens
et al. (2001).
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Applying dynamic programming we can write the value of equity as follows:

0
after default,
E (Π) =
(5)
−rdt
(1 − τ ) (Π − C) dt + e
ξ [E(Π + dΠ)] before default.
As can be seen, after default the equity value is nil (according to assumption
2). As shown in Appendix (A.2), (5) can be written as:
(
0
after default

(6)
E (Π) =
(1−τ
)
Π−C
β
(
)
(1−τ )(Π−C)
Π 2
−
before default
r
r
Π
As shown in (6), before default the equity value is given by the summation
between the perpetual rent (1−τ )(Π−C)
and the loss contingent on the event
r
(1−τ )(Π−C ) Π β2
of default, −
.
r
Π

2.2

Optimal default

Given (6), we can now calculate the default threshold point under debt financing. Following Leland (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001), we solve the
following problem:
(7)
max E (Π) .
Π

Using (6) and rearranging the F.O.C. of (7) gives
Π=

β2
C < C.
β2 − 1

(8)

This means that if the firm’s net cash flow is negative, equityholders can decide whether to inject further resources to meet the firm’s debt obligations or
to default. As long as they pay the coupon they can exploit future recoveries
in the value of their claim.

2.3

Optimal coupon

Substituting (4) and (6) into (2) gives the pre-default value of the firm: 11

  β2
(1 − τ ) Π
C
Π
C
Π
+ τ − (1 − τ ) α + τ
V (Π) =
.
(9)
r
r
r
r
Π
11

Recall that the after-default value of the firm is simply

(1−α)(1−τ )Π
.
r

6
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To find the optimal coupon we maximize (9) with respect to C. Differentiating the value function (9) with respect to C and rearranging gives:

− 1

 β2
τ
β2 − 1
h
i
Π.
C=
β2  (1 − β ) (1 − τ ) α β2 + τ 
2
β2 −1

(10)

Given (10), it is straightforward to see that ∂C
< 0. Moreover it is easy
∂α
∂C
12
to prove that ∂C
>
0.
Finally,
is
expected
to
be negative for realistic
∂τ
∂σ 2
parameter values. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: coeteris
paribus, an increase in volatility (i.e., σ 2 ) is expected to anticipate default
and its sunk cost. This induces firms to borrow less (and hence, choose a
lower coupon).

2.4

Tax revenue and welfare

Using the value function (9), we can easily obtain the present value of tax
revenue:
"
  #
 Π β2
τ
Π − C + C − αΠ
T (Π) =
.
(11)
r
Π
Of course, tax revenue is increasing in Π and decreasing in C. Moreover,
 β 2
, which measures the
given the inequality in (8), the term τr C − αΠ Π
Π
present value of tax revenues contingent on default, is positive. So, we can say
that default leads to a twofold effect: on the one hand, it causes a sunk cost;
on the other hand, it causes an increase in tax revenue, equal to τ C − αΠ
for any short period dt.
12

Taking the log of (10) gives:




β2 − 1
1
1
1
β2
log C = log
−
log τ +
log(1 − β2 ) +
log (1 − τ ) α
+ τ + log Π.
β2
β2
β2
β2
β2 − 1
Differentiating it with respect to τ gives:
"
#
2
2
1 − α β2β−1
α β2β−1
∂ log C
1 1
1

 > 0.
=−
−
=
−
2
∂τ
β2 τ
β2 τ (1 − τ ) α β2 + τ
(1 − τ ) α β2β−1
+τ
β2 −1

7
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As pointed out, the social welfare function is simply given by the summation between V (Π) and T (Π) , i.e.:
 β
Π Π 2
Π
W (Π) = V (Π) + T (Π) = − α
.
(12)
r
r Π
As can be seen, without default W (Π) is equal to the perpetual rent Πr . With
default however, it is lower.

3

A numerical analysis

In this section we use a numerical simulation to study the effects of default
on our representative firm’s value as well as on tax revenue and welfare. In
line with Bilicka and Devereux (2012) we set r = 5%. Also, we let the initial
value of EBIT be equal to 5. This allows us to normalize all the effects, since
the perpetual rent Π/r is equal to 100. Parameter τ is assumed to range
from 0 to 50%: most statutory tax rates range between 20% and 30% (e.g.,
Sørensen, 2017, uses an average rate of about 27%), although lower rates are
applied in many countries.
In line with Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we let the benchmark value of
standard deviation σ be 20%. Moreover, σ is assumed to range from 10% to
40% in order to run our sensitivity analysis.
As regards the value of α, the empirical evidence shows quite heterogeneous results. For instance, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) estimate distress
costs of 10–23% of firm value for a sample of 31 highly leveraged transactions. Branch (2002) finds a total default-related cost that ranges between
12.7% and 20.5%. Davydenko et al. (2012) estimate the cost of default for
an average defaulting firm to be 21.7% of the market value of assets. These
costs are shown to range from 14.7% for bond renegotiations to 30.5% for
default. Interestingly, Glover (2016) finds that the average firm expects a
default cost equal to 45% of its value under default. However, this cost is
estimated to be less (25%) among defaulted firms. Given these findings, we
therefore let α range from 10% to 50%.
It is worth noting that the cost of default depends not only on market
conditions but also on default rules. This means that, to some extent, the
government can affect the value of α by changing the insolvency regulation.13
13

For instance, time-consuming default procedures are expected to increase α and vice
versa.

8
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis of α on the value function with respect to τ .
Similarly, σ is affected by both systemic and firm-specific risk. If therefore
our policy-maker wants to improve financial stability we expect a decrease
in σ. For these reasons, we provide a numerical analysis which enables us to
analyze the effects of α, σ and τ on value function (9), tax revenue (11) and
welfare (12), respectively. Our benchmark values will be α = σ = 20% and
τ = 25%.
In figures 1-3 and table 1 we show the effects of α and τ on the firm’s
value, tax revenue and the welfare function, respectively, while in figures 4-6
and table 2, we show the effects of σ and τ on the same functions. In all
these figures the tax rate τ is set on the horizontal axis.
In figure 1 we focus on the value function. The solid line shows the effects
of τ on the value function, with α = σ = 20%, while dotted lines show the
same effects for different values of α, with σ = 20%. As can be seen, the firm’s
value is decreasing in τ , despite the tax benefit arising from the deductibility
of C. Not surprisingly, the greater the (sunk) default cost the lower the value
of V (Π).14
As shown in figure 2, tax revenue is increasing in τ : this means that no
Laffer curve exists. Moreover, if τ is low enough (below 38%), α has a positive
14

Figures about equity and debt value (as a function of τ ) are available upon request.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis of α on tax revenue with respect to τ .
impact on T (Π). This is due to the fact that default has a twofold impact
on our economic system. On the one hand, it causes a sunk cost; on the
other hand, it increases tax revenue, due to the elimination
 of interest rate
deductions (the value of such benefit is equal to τ C − αΠ dt). If therefore
τ is low enough, this latter effect dominates the previous one.
Figure 3 shows the effects of α and τ on welfare (with σ = 20%). As can
be seen, taxation causes a welfare loss. Moreover, α has a negative impact on
W (Π): this is not surprising since default causes a default cost. In particular,
the welfare loss is about 1.5% irrespective of the value of α, if τ is around
10%. When however the business tax rate reaches higher (and hence more
realistic) values, the effects of α on welfare are much more significant. For
instance, if τ is 25%, the welfare loss ranges from 1.81 (with α = 10%) to
3.97 (with α = 50%).
Table 1 provides a detailed sensitivity analysis for α. As can be seen, the
higher the parameters τ and α, the greater the welfare loss. To have an idea,
assume τ = 25%. As can be seen, the ratio between the welfare loss and tax
revenue ranges from 15.2% (with α = 10%) to 29.85% (with α = 50%). This
suggests that, if the policy-maker can reduce α, there may be a substantial
welfare gain.
Let us next focus on figures 4 to 6. Again, the solid line shows the effects
10
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of α on the welfare function with respect to τ .
Sensitivity Analysis on α (with σ = 0.2)
Value Function
τ = 10% τ = 20% τ = 25% τ = 30% τ = 40%
α = 10%
93.66
88.70
86.31
83.95
79.26
α = 20%
92.87
87.56
85.11
82.73
78.10
α = 30%
92.38
86.70
84.16
81.72
77.08
α = 40%
92.03
86.03
83.38
80.87
76.18
α = 50%
91.78
85.49
82.73
80.15
75.37
Tax Revenue
τ = 10% τ = 20% τ = 25% τ = 30% τ = 40%
α = 10%
5.19
9.64
11.88
14.14
18.68
α = 20%
5.78
9.99
12.05
14.12
18.29
α = 30%
6.28
10.47
12.41
14.33
18.14
α = 40%
6.68
10.97
12.85
14.65
18.15
α = 50%
7.01
11.45
13.30
15.03
18.28
Welfare Function
τ = 10% τ = 20% τ = 25% τ = 30% τ = 40%
α = 10%
98.86
98.34
98.19
98.09
97.94
α = 20%
98.65
97.55
97.16
96.86
96.39
α = 30%
98.65
97.17
96.57
96.05
95.22
α = 40%
98.71
96.99
96.22
95.52
94.33
α = 50%
98.79
96.94
96.03
95.18
93.65

Table 1: Numerical results of the sensitivity analysis of α.
11
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of σ on the value function with respect to τ .
of τ on the firm’s value (with α = σ = 20%). Similarly, dotted lines show
the effects of different values of σ, given α = 20%. If we compare the former
three figures with the latter ones, the quality of results is similar. Again, the
value function is decreasing in τ , while tax revenue is always increasing.
As shown in figure 4, the higher the parameter σ, the lower the firm’s
value is. This is due to the fact that an increase in volatility (i.e., default
risk) rises the contingent value of the default cost thereby reducing V (Π).
Figure 5 shows that, for any τ , volatility has a positive effect on T (Π).
As pointed out, an increase in σ makes default more likely. When it takes
place, C is no longer deductible and hence tax revenue rises. On the contrary,
W (Π) is decreasing in σ (see figure 6). This is not surprising since a (costly)
default has a negative impact on welfare (see function (12)). Overall, our
analysis shows that the negative effect of σ on the firm’s value dominates the
positive one on tax revenue.
Table 2 provides a sensitivity analysis for σ. As can be seen, default risk
does have an important impact. If, for instance, τ is 25%, the ratio between
the welfare loss and tax revenue ranges between 10.73% (with σ = 10%)
and 24.86% (with σ = 40%). Hence, for realistic values of τ , a reduction in
volatility may lead to a significant welfare gain.
These results have striking policy implications. If welfare is indeed the
12
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis of σ on tax revenue with respect to τ .

Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of σ on the welfare function with respect to τ .
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σ
σ
σ
σ

σ
σ
σ
σ

σ
σ
σ
σ

Sensitivity Analysis on σ (with α = 0.2)
Value Function
τ = 10% τ = 20% τ = 25% τ = 30% τ = 40%
= 10%
94.52
90.39
88.46
86.58
82.90
= 20%
92.87
87.56
85.11
82.73
78.10
= 30%
92.06
86.13
83.41
80.79
75.68
= 40%
91.60
85.29
82.42
79.65
74.28
Tax Revenue
τ = 10% τ = 20% τ = 25% τ = 30% τ = 40%
= 10%
4.43
7.84
9.51
11.19
14.56
= 20%
5.78
9.99
12.05
14.12
18.29
= 30%
6.50
11.08
13.33
15.58
20.11
= 40%
6.95
11.74
14.08
16.42
21.16
Welfare Function
τ = 10% τ = 20% τ = 25% τ = 30% τ = 40%
= 10%
98.95
98.23
97.98
97.77
97.46
= 20%
98.65
97.55
97.16
96.86
96.39
= 30%
98.56
97.21
96.74
96.36
95.80
= 40%
98.56
97.03
96.50
96.07
95.44

Table 2: Numerical results of the sensitivity analysis of σ.
relevant objective function, then the government has an incentive to reduce
both α and σ, for any τ. If however, the government’s objective function is
tax revenue, the converse is true at least for τ < 38%.

4

Conclusion

In this article we have shown that, under default risk, taxation is welfare
deteriorating. Moreover, we have shown that a government’s policy crucially
depends on whether its objective function is welfare or tax revenue. In particular, if welfare is the relevant objective function, then the government should
improve financial stability (i.e. reduce systemic risk) and cut default costs.
If however, the government’s objective function is tax revenue, default risk
and its costs would be beneficial.
In this article we have used a fairly simplified framework, which can be
enriched in the future. For instance, further research could study the welfare
effects of business taxation in a dynamic context, i.e., when a firm’s capital
structure can be subsequently modified and further investment can be made.
Moreover, such an analysis could be replicated under asymmetric information
14
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when agency costs arise.

A
A.1

Derivations of (4) and (6)
The value of debt

Applying Itô’s Lemma to (3) gives
rD(Π) = L +

σ2 2
Π DΠΠ (Π),
2

(13)

2

D(Π)
where L = (1 − α) (1 − τ ) Π, C, and DΠΠ (Π) ≡ ∂ ∂Π
2 . The general closedform solution of function (13) is therefore equal to:
(
P
(1−α)(1−τ )Π
+ 2i=1 Bi Πβi after default,
r
P
(14)
Dj (Π) =
2
C
βi
D
Π
before
default,
+
i
i=1
r

q 
q 
1 2
2r
1
1 2
where β1 = 21 +
+
>
1,
and
β
=
−
+ σ2r2 < 0 are the
2
2
σ2
2
2
two roots of the characteristic equation Ψ(β) ≡ 21 σ 2 β(β − 1) − r = 0. To
calculate Bi and Di for i = 1, 2, we need three boundary conditions. Firstly,
we assume that whenever Π goes to zero the lender’s claim is nil, namely
condition D (0) = 0 holds: this implies that B2 = 0. Secondly, we assume
that financial bubbles do not exist: this means that B1 = D1 = 0. Thirdly,
we must consider that at point Π = Π, the pre-default value of debt must be
equal to the post-default one, net of the default cost. Using the two branches
of (14) we thus obtain
β2
C
(1 − τ ) Π
= + D2 Π .
r
r
h
i −β2
)Π−C
Rearranging gives D2 = (1−α)(1−τ
Π . Hence, the value of debt is (4).
r

(1 − α)

A.2

The value of equity

Using (5) and Itô’s Lemma, we obtain the following non-arbitrage condition:
rE (Π) = (1 − τ ) (Π − C) +

σ2 2
Π EΠΠ (Π) ,
2

(15)
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before default. Since, after default, the general-form solution of (15) is:

after default,

 0
2
 X
E (Π) =
(16)
Π−C
(1
−
τ
)
+
Ai Πβi before default.


r
i=1

In the absence of financial bubbles, A1 is nil. To calculate A2 , we recall that
default occurs when Π = Π. In this case the value of equity falls to zero,
namely,

E Π = 0.
(17)
(1−τ )(Π−C ) −β2
Π .
r

Substituting (16) into (17), and solving for A2 gives A2 = −
Hence, the pre-default value of equity is equal to
  β2
(1 − τ ) (Π − C) (1 − τ ) Π − C
Π
E (Π) =
−
r
r
Π

(18)

and zero otherwise. These results give (6).
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